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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Appeals in Section
78-2a-3 of the Utah Code.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is taken from a final judgment of criminal
conviction on June 9, 1988, imposed by the Third Circuit Court,
Sandy Department, Honorable Robin W. Reese presiding.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Was the Defendant in actual physical control of a vehicle or
did the Defendant operate a vehicle for purposes of Section 119
of the Sandy City Traffic Code when police found the Defendant
seated in the driver's seat of a car stopped on an incline at ^
the side of the road turning a key in the ignition in an
attempt to start the car?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated, 76-1-501 (1) (1953, as amended):
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be
innocent until each element of the offense charged
against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be
acquitted.
Revised Ordinances of Sandy City, Section 119 (1):
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in
this section for any person to operate or be
in actual physical control of a vehicle within
this city if the person has a blood or breath
alcohol content of .08% or greater by weight as
shown by a chemical test given within two hours
after the alleged operation or physical
control, or if the person is under the
influence of alcohol or any drug, or the
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a
2

degree which renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts is limited to those facts relevant to
the issue of operation or actual physical control.
On November 2, 1985 at about 11:50 p.m., Officer Cravens of
the Sandy Police Department saw a vehicle stopped on the side
of 8600 South in Sandy City.

Trans. 3-4.

The road runs east

and west, inclining to the east in the area where the car was
stopped.
East.

Trans. 5.

The officer found the car at about 1815-~

Between 7th East and 20th East, the road inclines at

different levels.

Trans. 41.

The car was facing east on the shoulder of the road.
5.

Trans.

The officer could not recall whether any portion of the car

was on the pavement of the road but did say that it was on the
"pull-off section."

Trans. 6.

There was a partially

constructed church on the side of the road where the car was
stopped.

A park was on the other side.

Trans. 5.

When the officer approached the vehicle, he noticed that
someone was seated directly behind the steering wheel of the
vehicle and could hear the grinding of the car's starting
motor.

Trans. 7.

When the officer reached the vehicle, he

found the defendant, the only occupant, to be the person behind
the steering wheel.
the ignition.

He also noticed that there were keys in

Trans. 7.

The Defendant later claimed in court

that by attempting to start the car he was merely trying to
show the officer that the car was having troubles.
3

Trans. 46.

But he also admitted that while sitting in the car before the
officer arrived he would "every now and again . . . just sit
there and twist the key."

Trans. 43.

Both the Defendant and his brother, Michael, stated at trial
that Michael had driven the car to the point where it had
stopped. Trans. 36 and 43.

Not being able to start the

vehicle, Michael said he left to find a telephone.

Trans. 36.

However, to the best of the officer's recollection, he did not
remember the Defendant's saying that someone else had driven
the car.

Trans. 29.

And Michael admitted not telling the

officer upon first meeting him that he had been driving the
car.

He explained that he was as "drunk" as the Defendant anc|

said that he did not want to incriminate himself.

Trans. 37.

Rather, Michael said he first told the officer that his brother
had not driven the car and only afterwards stated that he
specifically had driven the car.

Trans. 37-38.

The officer

did not recall whether Michael made any such statements.

Trans

30-31.
After approaching the car and hearing the car's engine being
turned over, the officer asked the Defendant why he was there
and the Defendant indicated that "he was having car troubles."
Trans. 9.

Specifically, the Defendant said that his car was

flooded and stated further to the officer, "Smell the Carb."
Trans. 10.

The Defendant's brother also stated at trial that

when the car stopped he believed that the engine might have
been flooded.

Trans. 36.

Officer Cravens testified that a car
4

which is flooded is not disabled permanently and can be
restarted.

Trans. 10-11.

After the Defendant's arrest, the car was towed to an
impound lot.

Michael picked the car up at the lot.

He had to

jump the car to another vehicle before the starting motor would
operate.

After connecting the jumper cables, he tried starting

the car without success.
started.

He then put gas in the car and it

However, Michael said that even before he put gas in

the car the gas gauge showed that the tank was not completely
empty and that this was exactly how the gauge had read the
night before.

Trans. 38-39.

Furthermore, Michael, who said he

had experience in auto mechanics, admitted that there may have
been gas in the fuel tank but that it would not flow into the
fuel line

connected to the fuel tank because of the incline on

8600 South.

He admitted further that a change in the incline

could have caused fuel to flow into the fuel line.

Trans. 41.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
For a conviction under Section 119 of the Sandy City Traffic
Code, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the Defendant operated or was in actual physical control of a
vehicle.
Actual physical control means "present bodily restraint,
directing influence, domination or regulation."

This standard

can be met by actions which fall short of actual operation of a
vehicle.

The standards for "operation" and "actual physical

control" are, therefore, separate and distinct.

5

That the Defendant was in actual physical control is proven
by the fact that he was found behind the steering wheel of the
vehicle, not only had possession of the keys but had them in
the car's ignition, and was attempting to start the car.
The Defendant argues that he was not in actual physical
control because, he claims, the car was either flooded or out
of gas.

The question, then, is whether a vehicle's ability to

operate should be considered part of the standard for
determining actual physical control.
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that it should not.
This conclusion is based on the policy that 1) people who are
intoxicated should not be permitted to enter a vehicle except
as passengers or passive occupants, and 2) that intoxicated
drivers should be apprehended before they strike, such that the
actual physical control requirement should not be read "to
exclude those whose vehicles are presently immobile because of
mechanical trouble."
But even if vehicle operability is considered part of the
standard for determining actual physical control, there was
still sufficient evidence to show actual physical control.

The

evidence does not show conclusively that the car was in fact
out of gas.

To the contrary, there was evidence that the car

either flooded or only low on gas.

Furthermore, because the

vehicle was stopped on a hill, it was probably capable of
motion even if the engine would not run.
There was also sufficient evidence to show that the
6

Defendant had operated the vehicle.

It was clear that someone

had driven the vehicle to the point it was stopped.
Defendant was behind the steering wheel.
was trying to start the car.

The

He had the keys.

He

In addition, the officer did not

recall either the Defendant or his brother stating at the time
of the investigation that the Defendant's brother had been
driving.
ARGUMENT
THE DEFENDANT WAS IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE IN
VIOLATION OF SECTION 119.
A. For Purposes of Section 119 of the Sandy Traffic Code,
The Issues of "Operation" and "Actual Physical Control" are
Proven by Separate Standards.
In any DUI case in the state of Utah, the prosecution must
prove that a defendant was either operating a vehicle or in
actual physical control.

U.C.A. 41-6-44(1)(a); Section 119

(l)(a), Traffic Code of Sandy City.

Before proceeding to a

discussion of the facts in this case, if is important to
establish the difference between the issues of "operation" and
"actual physical control."
The issues of operation and actual physical control are
separate, although in most case both can be shown.

For

example, the typical DUI defendant is stopped after a police
officer witnesses the defendant driving a vehicle in an erratic
or improper manner.

The defendant is "operating" the vehicle

by the common understanding of the word.

The defendant is also

in "actual physical control" as the term was defined in State
v. Bugger:

"present bodily restraint, directing influence,
7

domination or regulation,"

483 P.2d 442 (Utah 1971).

The issues become more distinct in other cases.

A person

found beside a vehicle unconscious because of injury or
intoxication, for example, is not in actual physical control
because there is no present bodily restraint or direction of
influence, domination, or regulation.

But the prosecution may

still be able to show through circumstantial evidence that the
defendant had operated the vehicle.
There are, however, cases much the opposite.

There may be

little or no evidence that the defendant operated the vehicle
or that the vehicle was operated at all.

But the defendant

might be found exerting control over the vehicle by such

t

actions as sitting behind the steering wheel and having the key
in the ignition—whether or not the vehicle is running. "These
are cases, similar to the case at hand, in which actual
physical control comes directly into issue.
B. Whether the Vehicle in Which the Defendant was
Positioned was Operable Should Not be Considered in Resolving
the Issue of Actual Physical Control.
The argument that the Defendant was in actual physical
control is based on the legal definition of actual physical
control and the policy behind DUI law.
The question of whether the Defendant was in actual physical
control rests on whether, as stated above, he was exerting
present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or
regulation over the vehicle.

State v. Bugger; Garcia v.

Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1982); State v. Smelter,
8

674 P.2d 690, 692 (Wash. App. 1984).

There were facts

sufficient for the trial court to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that such control existed.

An appellate court should

offer great deference such a finding "unless the trial court
has misapplied the law or its findings are clearly against the
weight of the evidence."

Garcia, at 653.

Officer Cravens found the Defendant fully conscious,
directly behind the steering wheel of the car.

The Defendant

not only had possession of the keys to the vehicle, but had the
keys in the ignition and was attempting to start the car.
These facts are uncontroverted.

If the car had started, there

would have been no question that the Defendant was in actual
physical control.
Many courts have held that acts short of starting a car are
sufficient to constitute actual physical control:

Hughes v.

State, 535 P.2d 1023 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975), Defendant was
improperly parked in residential area while seated in front
seat with key in the ignition and engine off; City of
Cincinnati v. Kelley, 351 N.E.2d 85 (Ohio 1976), Defendant was
legally parked while seated in driver's seat with hands on
steering wheel and keys in the ignition and engine off; State
v. Schuler, 243 N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1976), Defendant was in the
driver's seat of a car in a ditch, keys in ignition.
Therefore, the decision of the trial court was justified by the
evidence.
The issue on appeal, however, is one of interpretation of
9

law:

Was the Defendant was in actual physical control when the

Defendant has claimed that the vehicle vehicle was inoperable
because it was either flooded or out of gas?

The prosecution

contests that the vehicle was inoperable, and that argument
will be addressed later.
The immediate question is whether vehicle operability should
be considered part of the standard for actual physical control.
One court has made the operability of the vehicle part of the
elements of actual physical control:

Along with active or

constructive possession of the keys and position of the
Defendant in the driver's seat, the vehicle must be "operable
to some extent."

Key v. Town of Kinsey, 424 So.2d 701, 703-4<

(Ala. Ct. App. 1982); quoted in Smelter, at 692.
No such guidelines concerning the operation of the vehicle
have been established in Utah.

In fact, the Utah Supreme Court

has excluded the operability of the vehicle from the standard
for actual physical control.

In Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d

778 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a district
court's affirmation of a decision by the Utah State Driver
License Division to revoke the Defendant's driver's license
under Section 41-6-44.10 of the Utah Code.

This statute

requires a finding of operation or actual physical control of a
vehicle before a person's driver's license may be revoked for
failure to submit to a breath test.
In Lopez, police officers found the defendant in the
driver's seat of a pickup truck with his head resting on the
10

steering wheel.

The engine was not running, but the keys were

in the ignition and when the officer removed them he had to
turn them to get them out.

JEd. at 779.

The Defendant stated

at trial, for the first time, that his wife had actually been
driving when the battery died.

He stated that he was waiting

for her to return with a car with which they could tow the
truck.

Id. at 780.

In finding that the Defendant was in actual physical
control, the Court decided as a matter of policy that vehicle
operability is unnecessary to proof of actual physical control.
Speaking of actual physical control, the Court said:

"That

requirement was intended by our legislature to protect public
safety and apprehend the drunken driver before he or she
strikes, . . . and may not be construed to exclude those"whose
vehicle are presently immobile because of mechanical trouble.
Id. at 781 (Citations excluded).
In addition to this conclusion, the Lopez Court appears to
have takem one further step in its analysis of actual physical
control.

In analyzing the issue of actual physical control,

the Court focused heavily on the position the Defendant in the
driver's seat.

It distinguished the case from State v. Bugger

in which actual physical control was not found when the
Defendant was found sleeping in a vehicle parked completely off
the road with the engine off and when there was no evidence
that he Defendant was behind the driver's seat.

Id.

at 780.

After the Court concluded its analysis of actual physical
11

control, it noted some facts which normally would go to the
issue of operation rather than actual physical control.

The

Court stated that the trial court "found that there were tire
tracks leading up to the vehicle" and "that the vehicle had to
have reached its point of rest
Id. at 781.

apparently on its own power.'"

By including these additional facts, the Court may

have suggested that facts which go to operation may be used to
reinforce the finding of actual physical control.
Based on Lopez, the Defendant in the case at hand should be
found in actual physical control despite any claim that the
vehicle was inoperable.

Lopez, in effect, established a bright

line rule for cases in which the claim is made that the vehicle
was inoperable.

This is not a new rule in Utah.

Lopez was

based on Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982).
In Garcia, the Utah Supreme Court again addressed the
question of actual physical control in relation to Section 416-44.10.

In this case, the defendant's vehicle was operable,

but the vehicle could not have moved far because it was boxed
in by a fence several feet in front and a car several feet
behind.

The defendant was found behind the steering wheel

attempting to start the car.
The Court stated specifically that the standard for
determining whether someone was "driving" or "operating" a
vehicle was different from the standard for determining whether
someone was "in actual physical control."

_Id. at 653.

The

Court noted that in 1969 the legislature added the actual
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physical control language to the preexisting "driving"
language, suggesting the legislature specifically expanded the
scope of 41-6-44.10.

Ld. at 653, n.l.

In holding that the defendant was in actual physical
control, the Court concluded that the actual physical control
language of 41-6-44.10 "should be read as intending to prevent
intoxicated drivers from entering their vehicles except as
passengers or passive occupants."

Jd. at 654.

It can be

assumed that the same raltionale applies to Section 41-6-44,
the statute on which Sandy City's DUI ordinance is based,
because it has a similar history to Section 41-6-44.10.
A bright line rule which excludes vehicle operability as
part of the standard for finding actual physical control is
logical in view of the confusion that would otherwise result.
Many DUI cases would have a built-in defense to actual physical
control.

In cases similar to the one at hand, defendants could

come to court claiming that the vehicle was inoperable because
of any number of mechanical problems.

These claims would be

difficult to rebut unless in each of these case the arresting
officer takes the awkward and burdensome step of testing the
car for operability.
Of course, there are logical limitations to a bright line
rule.

If a vehicle is visibly inoperable, as where, for

example, it does not have an engine or tires, an occupant would
generally not be in actual physical control.

But when the

vehicle is operable by all outward appearances, an occupant is
13

in actual physical control when there are facts to support
existing or present bodily restraint, or direction of
influence, domination, or regulation.
Following the reasoning above, there was evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was in actual
physical control of a vehicle.

It might be argued that Lopez

and Garcia are distinguishable from this case because they were
decided under a preponderance of evidence standard.

But there

are so few facts that go into determining actual physical
control that the issue is essentially a yes or no question.
The factors to be considered are whether the defendant had
possession of the keys and whether the defendant was seated inf.
the driver's seat.
operation.

Little more can be shown short of actual

The Defendant in this case was in the driver's

seat, and he not only had possession of the keys but had them
in the ignition and was attempting to start the engine.
C. The Defendant was in Actual Physical Control even if the
Operability of the Vehicle is Considered.
Even if the operability of the vehicle is considered a
component of actual physical control, there are facts in the
record that support a conclusion that the vehicle was operable.
First, the record does not show conclusively that the car
was out of gas.

To the contrary, there was evidence that the

car's gas gauge did not indicate the vehicle was empty.
Furthermore, the Defendant told the officer that the vehicle
was flooded, suggesting that there was gas.

It is common

knowledge among drivers that a flooded car can start at any
14

time, and Officer Cravens testified to this effect.
It is also common knowledge that even if a car stalls for
lack of gas, there is often enough gas left over for the car to
start for a brief period.

It would take little movement of a

vehicle by an intoxicated driver to cause an accident.

This

appears to have been the conclusion of the Court in Garcia in
which the vehicle could only have been moved several feet.
The fact that the vehicle started after the Defendant's put
gas in it is not conclusive that the vehicle was out of gas.
The record shows only that the Defendant's brother went to the
impound lot and attempted without success to start the vehicle.
He then put gas in the vehicle and it started.

The record does

not show,, however, how many times Michael attempted to start
the car.

It is possible that had he attempted further the car

may have started.

The brother admitted that the car might have

just been low on gas and that the incline on 8600 South tipped
the gas tank in such a position that gas was not getting into
the fuel line.

The change in incline between 8600 South and

the impound lot may have been enough to cause fuel to flow into
the line and start the engine had he attempted further to start
the car.
Second, the record is not conclusive that even if the
vehicle was out of gas it could not have either moved by its
own momentum or been moved to a place where it could have been
started.

The record is replete with indications that the

vehicle was traveling up an incline when it stopped.
15

If the

vehicle was parked on an incline, it is possible that had the
Defendant, intentionally or not, taken off the brake and taken
the vehicle out of gear it would have rolled down hill,
presenting the same sort of danger to the public that the DUI
laws are drafted to prevent.
Furthermore, the vehicle might have been pushed or rolled to
a level where it would be able to start.

Again, the

Defendant's brother testified that at a different incline, fuel
might have been able to flow into the fuel line.

And the

Defendant's brother testified that 8600 South varies in level
of incline.
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD<
OPERATED A VEHICLE IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 119.
One more point needs to be discussed.
been on actual physical control.

So far the focus has

But there was sufficient

evidence to show that the Defendant "operated" the vehicle to
the point at which the police officer found it stopped.
First, there was evidence that someone had been operating
the vehicle to the point where the officer found it.

Officer

Cravens observed the vehicle in an area where cars would not
normally be parked:

a park was on one side of the road, and it

was, presumably, closed at the time; a partially constructed
church was on the side of the road where the car was stopped.
Officer Cravens could see a person in the car as he approached.
Second, there was sufficient evidence to show that the
defendant was the person who had operated the vehicle.
Defendant was found in the driver's seat.
16

The

He had possession of

the key.

He was found trying to start the car.

When Officer

Cravens asked the Defendant why he was there, the Defendant
said that he was having car troubles.
The Defendant said that the reason he was trying to start
the car when the officer pulled up was to demonstrate that the
car would not start.

This explanation is particularly unlikely

in view of the fact that 1) someone had run down the battery,
most likely attempting to start the car, 2) no evidence was
offered that the battery was low when the brother left the
vehicle to find a phone, and 3) the Defendant stated that while
waiting in the car he would turn the key every so often.
One further piece of evidence is persuasive that the
Defendant had operated the vehicle.

Officer Cravens did not

recall that either the Defendant or his brother stated at the
time of the investigation that Michael had actually been
driving.

Certainly, a police officer would have noted such a

statement in his report and been prepared to address the issue
at trial.
It appears, then, that the issue was raised for the first
time at trial.

Such was the case in Lopez and the Court very

clearly stated its disapproval.

Id.

at 780.

The Defendant and

his brother testified that they did tell the officer that the
brother was driving.
doubt.

But these testimonies are hedged in

The brother said that he didn't tell the officer at

first because he was intoxicated himself and did not want to
incriminate himself.

This explanation may hold some
17

credibility because it is against the brother's interest, but
it is also a little too convenient.
Finally, even if the evidence is insufficient to show
operation, under Lopez evidence of operation may be used to
reinforce a finding of actual physical control.
CONCLUSION
The standard for determining whether a driver is in actual
physical control of a vehicle for purposes of the this state's
DUI laws should be consistent with the policy of not allowing
intoxicated people in a vehicle except as passengers or passive
occupants.

That standard should, therefore, not include the

issue of whether the vehicle was operable.

The Defendant was

therefore in actual physical control of the vehicle because he
was in the driver's seat, had possession of the keys, and was
attempting to start the vehicle.

Based on this and the other

forgoing arguments, the Respondent respectfully requests that
the judgment of the trial court be affirmed.
DATED January 30, 1989.
Respectfully Submitted,

C^J^/
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Clifford W. Lark
Sandy City Prosecutor
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copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, by Certified Mail,
to Ronald E. Kunz of Cook and Wilde, 6925 Union Park Center,
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